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INTRODUCTION
Madagascar is regarded as one of the most important areas for biodiversity on Earth. The island is a global priority for conservation (Goodman and Benstead 2003; Myers et al. 2000) because its biodiversity faces a wide variety of threats, including habitat loss and fragmentation, and overexploitation of commercially valuable species of plants and animals.
Changes in human activity on the island have resulted in an alarming rate of deforestation in Madagascar (Nelson and Horning 1993) , putting both biodiversity and local livelihoods at risk (Donohoe 2003; UNDP et al. 2000) . It is estimated that (Jarosz 1993) , population growth (Green and Sussman 1990) , timber export (UNDP et al. 2000) , and local, national, and global political and economic factors (Kull 2000; Moser 2006 ). In addition to such global factors, major domestic threats to forests in Madagascar include clearing for subsistence agriculture (tavy), charcoal, timber, and mining (Ganzhorn et al. 1997) . Although the practice of tavy may be a low -input, labor -efficient agricultural technique, it has negative impacts such as increased soil compaction and erosion (Erdmann 2003) .
However, other factors such as political resistance to restrictive policies have also been identified as contributing to current rates of deforestation (Klein 2002; Jarosz 1993) . 
PRE-COLONIAL FOREST POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Forest conservation and management in Madagascar has a long history that dates back to pre -colonial times (Table 1) . James Sibree, a British missionary who spent 50 years on the island attributed deforestation to shifting agriculture and timber concessions: [Madagascar is] being diminished every year by the wholesale destruction of the forest in burning it for riceplanting, and it is grievous to see how recklessly it is cut down and destroyed for this and other more trivial reasons. The large concessions of forest land to European companies for timbercutting and plantations also tend in the same direction, and unless some plan of forest conservation is soon effected, the Nonetheless, despite decades of forest conservation laws, the decrease in Madagascar's forests throughout most of the twentieth century has been attributed to corruption among forest service employees, lack of motivation to adhere to forest policies among poor rural people, and the government's inability to monitor the forest and enforce policies because of a lack of resources, bad roads, and difficult terrain (Ganzhorn et al. 1997 ). (Brechin et al. 2002) . This discourse views development as a linear trajectory from less developed to developed, that should be followed by all nations regardless of culture, resource availability, or history. Similarly, the discourse advocates standardized approaches to achieving development from site to site (Scott 1998; Peet and Hartwick 1999) .
Results of this discourse and policy were that protected areas were disjointed from the economic development activities in peripheral zones meant to serve as alternatives to destructive environmental practices. Providing health centers or schools did not dissuade local people from practicing tavy, and the link between conservation and development was not made. Thus, the government, along with conservation and development donors and implementing organizations, imposed a model of development ill -suited to the local context in many ways, and local people struggled to navigate the new webs of relationships and institutions created by ICDPs.
Evaluations of Phase I activities indicated that the creation of a few dozen protected areas was not a viable approach to long -term sustainable management of Madagascar's natural resources (Montagne 2004 ). In addition, the ICDP model was deemed too centralized and standardized across sites to respond to local -level specificities. As a result, the Malagasy government and other actors interested in sustainable forest management began to look for new legal structures and institutional arrangements for forest governance. This trend reflects a global move toward more bottom -up, democratic, and participatory methods for designing and implementing natural resource -related policies and programs in developing countries (Durbin and Ralambo 1994; Peters 1998; Brechin et al. 1991; Chambers 1997 ).
COMMUNITY -BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT
In the 1990s, faced with high rates of deforestation and inefficient forestry practices, the Malagasy government, with support from international conservation and development organizations, pushed for a new community -based natural resources management policy (Bertrand 1994; Rajaonson et al. 1995; Kull 2002) . This policy, known as GELOSE, is applicable to forests, pastures, wildlife, and water. It aims to promote better resource management through local -level management, rule -setting, and enforcement, leading to better environment stewardship.
GELOSE was signed into law on September 10, 1996 (law No.
96 -025), and in 1997, the law was incorporated into the new national forestry policy (Law 97 -107 and Decree 97 -1200).
The GELOSE law allows for the creation of tripartite negotiated contracts among the state (represented by the forest service), the municipality (i.e., mayor's office), and a voluntary association of community residents created for the purpose of this contract (i.e., Communauté de Base or COBA). The law does not stipulate how this association should be constituted -it may be constituted through some form of representation or include all village residents. However, no local resident can be excluded from the COBA association. Under GELOSE contracts, communities regulate resource use through dina, a locally -developed social agreement whose form pre -dates state -sanctioned rules (Henkels 2001; Marcus 2000) . Contract negotiations are coordinated by an "environmental mediator"
and the process for establishing a GELOSE contract, which is described in legislation, includes 22 steps (Kull 2002) .
Only in GELOSE and GCF arrangements, whether or not associated with protected areas, can have a strong conservation component.
Despite rhetoric of local empowerment to make decisions about forest management, these governance arrangements are substantially controlled. COBA are given management responsibilities for an initial period of three years, renewable for ten years.
They are not granted land tenure (though under GELOSE there is an option for enhanced tenure security). In addition, third parties such as conservation and development NGOs play a strong role in orienting management plans and zoning of these areas. Their field agents often initiate community -level discussions regarding resource management and their agendas are often reflected in the management plans or zoning systems developed for community -managed areas (e.g., Antona et al. 2004 ). Thus, the effort to decentralize forest management in Madagascar has transferred some powers to local people while maintaining a certain level of centralized control.
CONCLUSION
Forest management in Madagascar has evolved over the last century from top -down, centralized legislation that aimed to restrict access to forest resources to more decentralized governance forms that attempt to put local people at the center of decision making. Although by tracing legislation this trend is clearly apparent, implementing truly decentralized governance is a complex process that involves institutional structure and power dynamics that are difficult to modify. In Madagascar, decentralized governance arrangements are changing the web of interactions among actors such as government, international agencies, and local communities in an attempt to shape power dynamics. Nevertheless, it is still unclear the extents to which local communities are able to capture the opportunity these changes represent and ensure their interests are represented.
Understanding how these dynamics are evolving is a crucial step for monitoring the implementation of these policies and improving upon them over time. Additional research is needed to assess how these institutional changes are affecting principles of good governance such as participation, accountability, and transparency in decision making.
